Eligibility requires identity
The organiser must know enough about a person to approve or refuse voting access.
Cas d’usage
Prove the ballot is present without proving how a person voted.
CharterVote separates eligibility from ballot content, then gives voters a receipt they can check against the anonymous public record.
No card needed. Small votes can start on the free tier.
The governance problem
The count is only one part of a credible vote.
A secret ballot needs two things that can appear to conflict: strict control over who votes and no link from an eligible voter to the choices stored in the ballot box.
Secrecy requires separation
Once the vote is cast, identity must not travel with the ballot content.
Trust requires a useful check
A voter needs evidence that the ballot arrived without receiving a receipt that can reveal or sell a vote.
A governed workflow
From eligible roll to published record
The separation is enforced across the complete election journey, not added as a label at the end.
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01
Establish eligibility
The member registers and an organiser reviews the submitted information.
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02
Issue single-use access
Approval creates one voting token that can be consumed only once.
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03
Store an anonymous ballot
The ballot record carries no member or registration reference.
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04
Check anonymous inclusion
The voter compares the issued receipt with the public bulletin record without exposing a selection.
Defensible benefits
Useful controls, stated without overclaiming.
The public checks make narrow, defensible statements rather than claiming that technology can prove everything about a vote.
Access
One approved voter, one token
The eligibility workflow controls token issuance and the voting service rejects a token after it has been used.
Storage
No voter link on the ballot
The anonymous ballot storage model excludes voter and registration identifiers from the ballot record.
Vérification
Receipt inclusion without vote disclosure
The public bulletin can find the ballot hash represented by the receipt without displaying the choices inside that ballot.
Une limite clairement énoncée
What a secret-ballot system cannot establish
CharterVote cannot prove who was holding a device, whether the device was secure, whether a voter was coerced, or whether the submitted selection matched the voter's private intent. Those limits are stated on the verification page.
Questions before you choose
Frequently asked questions
Can an organiser connect a stored ballot to a member?
The ballot record is designed without a member or registration reference. Eligibility and token issuance are handled before the anonymous ballot is stored.
Does the receipt reveal how someone voted?
No. The receipt represents an anonymous ballot hash. It does not contain voter identity or ballot selections.
Can a voter use the same token twice?
No. Voting access is single-use, and the service rejects a token after its ballot has been cast.
Does an online secret ballot prevent coercion?
No. A remote voting platform cannot establish who controlled a device or what happened around the voter. CharterVote does not claim otherwise.
Start with a real test
Run a private ballot with a public verification boundary.
See the exact checks first, then create a team when the model fits your election rules.